Ask your cloud anything without breaking prod. Read-only.
Open-source AI CLI that answers security questions across cloud, code and runtime - GitHub, GitLab, AWS, GCP, Azure, K8s. Ask in plain language: "what's publicly exposed that shouldn't be?" or "can my CI escalate to cloud admin?". Read-only by construction: every call is resolved to its IAM actions and authorized against a read-only policy before credentials attach. It can't modify your infra even if asked. Unlike MCP tools, it writes JS in a sandboxed runtime - a script per turn, not one call.
A debate we had: do we just document how to scope credentials right and leave it to you - or enforce read-only even if you run it with admin creds? We went with enforcing it, despite the tradeoff of keeping up as providers ship new APIs. Pulling permission definitions from each provider (a few MB, daily by default) instead of a static map keeps coverage current automatically. Every API call is resolved to the IAM actions it needs and authorized against the provider's own policy definitions before a credential is attached, failing closed on anything it can't classify. The allowed sets come from the providers themselves (AWS IAM action simulation, GCP role permission eval, Azure RBAC role definitions, the K8s cluster own live view RBAC role) so coverage tracks the APIs as they grow. On AWS, assumed-role credentials are additionally re-vended through STS AssumeRole scoped to SecurityAudit. Every request host is pinned to its mapped service and region and the resolved IP is verified before connecting, so the agent can only reach your own infra. The code execution has no host access and every call is enforced to go through the read-only action gate or it fails.
About Cynative Security Research Agent on Product Hunt
“Ask your cloud anything without breaking prod. Read-only.”
Cynative Security Research Agent launched on Product Hunt on July 27th, 2026 and earned 102 upvotes and 22 comments, placing #17 on the daily leaderboard. Open-source AI CLI that answers security questions across cloud, code and runtime - GitHub, GitLab, AWS, GCP, Azure, K8s. Ask in plain language: "what's publicly exposed that shouldn't be?" or "can my CI escalate to cloud admin?". Read-only by construction: every call is resolved to its IAM actions and authorized against a read-only policy before credentials attach. It can't modify your infra even if asked. Unlike MCP tools, it writes JS in a sandboxed runtime - a script per turn, not one call.
On the analytics side, Cynative Security Research Agent competes within Open Source, Developer Tools and Security — topics that collectively have 588k followers on Product Hunt. The dashboard above tracks how Cynative Security Research Agent performed against the three products that launched closest to it on the same day.
Who hunted Cynative Security Research Agent?
Cynative Security Research Agent was hunted by Ben Lang. A “hunter” on Product Hunt is the community member who submits a product to the platform — uploading the images, the link, and tagging the makers behind it. Hunters typically write the first comment explaining why a product is worth attention, and their followers are notified the moment they post. Around 79% of featured launches on Product Hunt are self-hunted by their makers, but a well-known hunter still acts as a signal of quality to the rest of the community. See the full all-time top hunters leaderboard to discover who is shaping the Product Hunt ecosystem.
For a complete overview of Cynative Security Research Agent including community comment highlights and product details, visit the product overview.
Ben Lang
A debate we had: do we just document how to scope credentials right and leave it to you - or enforce read-only even if you run it with admin creds? We went with enforcing it, despite the tradeoff of keeping up as providers ship new APIs. Pulling permission definitions from each provider (a few MB, daily by default) instead of a static map keeps coverage current automatically. Every API call is resolved to the IAM actions it needs and authorized against the provider's own policy definitions before a credential is attached, failing closed on anything it can't classify. The allowed sets come from the providers themselves (AWS IAM action simulation, GCP role permission eval, Azure RBAC role definitions, the K8s cluster own live view RBAC role) so coverage tracks the APIs as they grow. On AWS, assumed-role credentials are additionally re-vended through STS AssumeRole scoped to SecurityAudit. Every request host is pinned to its mapped service and region and the resolved IP is verified before connecting, so the agent can only reach your own infra. The code execution has no host access and every call is enforced to go through the read-only action gate or it fails.